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Abstract
Abstract: Does a one percent increase in aggregate driving increase accident costs by more
than one percent? Vickrey [1968] and Edlin [1999] answer yes, arguing that as a new driver
takes to the road, she increases the accident risk to others as well as assuming risk herself. On
the other hand, more driving could result in increased congestion, lower speeds, and less severe
or less frequent accidents. We study the question with panel data on state-average insurance
premiums and loss costs. We …nd that in high tra¢c density states, an increase in tra¢c density
dramatically increases aggregate insurance premiums and loss costs. In California, for example,
we estimate that a typical additional driver increases the total of other people’s insurance costs
by $1271-2432. In contrast, the accident externality per driver in low tra¢c states appears quite
small. On balance, accident externalities are so large that a correcting Pigouvian tax could raise
$45 billion in California alone, and over $140 billion nationally. It is not clear the extent to
which this externality results from increases in accident rates, accident severity or both. It is
also not clear whether the same externality pertains to underinsured accident costs like fatality
risk.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Does driving, as distinct from driving badly, entail substantial accident externalities, externalities
that tort law does not internalize? Equivalently, does a one percent increase in aggregate driving
increase aggregate accident costs by more than one percent? Vickrey [1968] and Edlin [2003] answer
yes to both questions, arguing that as a new driver takes to the road, she increases the accident risk
to others as well as assuming risk herself, and that tort law does not adequately account for this.
On the other hand, the reverse could hold. The riskiness of driving could decrease as aggregate
driving increases, because such increases could worsen congestion and if people are forced to drive
at lower speeds, accidents could become less severe or less frequent. As a consequence, a one
percent increase in driving could increase aggregate accident costs by less than one percent, and
could in principle even decrease those costs. 1
The stakes are large. The total cost of auto accidents in the U.S. is over $100 billion each
year, as measured by insurance premiums, and could be over $350 billion, if we include costs that
are not insured.2 Moreover, multi-vehicle accidents, which are the source of potential accident
externalities, dominate these …gures, accounting for over 70% of auto accidents. If we assume that
exactly two vehicles are necessary for multi-vehicle accidents to occur, then one would expect the
marginal cost of accidents to exceed the average cost by 70%. Put di¤erently, one would expect
aggregate accident costs to rise by 1.7% for every 1% increase in aggregate driving.3 Edlin’s [1999]
estimates from calibrating a simple theoretical model of two-vehicle accidents suggested that the
1A little introspection will probably convince most readers that crowded roadways are more dangerous than open
ones. In heavy tra¢c, most us feel compelled to a constant vigilance to avoid the numerous moving hazards. This
vigilance no doubt works to o¤set the dangers we perceive but seems unlikely to completely counter balance them.
Note also that the cost of stress and tension that we experience in tra¢c are partly accident avoidance costs and
should properly be included in a full measure of accident externality costs.
2The $100 billion …gure comes from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners [1997], and the $350
billion comes from Urban Institute [1991]. Even this $350 billion …gure does not include the cost of tra¢c delays
caused by accidents.
3The elasticity of accident costs with respect to driving is the ratio of marginal to average cost. Marginal cost
exceeds average cost if multiple drivers are the logical, or “but for,” cause of the accident. This calculation neglects
the possibility that extra driving increases congestion and thereby lowers accident costs, but it also neglects the
possibility that more than two cars are necessary causes of many multi-car accidents, and that the per-vehicle
damages in multicar accidents may be higher than the damages in single car accidents.
2size of accident externalities in a high tra¢c density state such as New Jersey is so large that a
correcting Pigouvian tax could more than double the price of gasoline. If accidents typically involve
more than 2 vehicles, as depicted in the picture below, then externalities will be even larger.
If the elasticity of aggregate accident costs with respect to aggregate driving exceeds unity, then
the tort system will not provide adequate incentives. The reason is that the tort system is designed
to allocate the damages from an accident among the involved drivers according to a judgment of
their fault. In principle, a damage allocation system can provide adequate incentives for careful
driving, but it will not provide people with adequate incentives at the margin of deciding how much
to drive or whether to become a driver, at least not if the elasticity of accident costs exceeds unity
(see Green [1976], Shavell [1980], and Cooter and Ulen [1988]).4 Indeed, contributory negligence,
comparative negligence and no-fault systems all su¤er this inadequacy because they are all simply
di¤erent rules for dividing the cost of accidents among involved drivers and their insurers. If the
accident elasticity exceeds unity, then in order to provide e¢cient incentives at these two margins,
the drivers in a given accident should in aggregate be made to bear more than the total cost of
the accident (with the balance going to a third party such as the government). An elasticity
exceeding unity suggests that in a given accident, a person driving carefully is often just as much
the accident’s cause as a negligent driver in the sense that had the safe driver not been driving and
presenting an “accident target,” the accident might have been avoided. If each involved driver is a
necessary cause of an accident then e¢cient incentives require that each bear the full cost of that
accident; for example, each could bear her own cost and write the government a check equal to the
cost of others.
Surprisingly there is relatively little empirical work gauging the size (and sign) of the accident
externality from driving. Vickrey [1968], who was the …rst to conceptualize clearly the accident
externality from the quantity of driving (as opposed to the quality of driving), cites data on two
4These authors do not put the matter in terms of the elasticity of aggregate accidents with respect to driving,
but instead in terms of two parties being necessary causes of an accident. The two ideas are equivalent, however, as
Edlin (1999) explains more fully.
3A tangle of vehicles filled Interstate 74
Source: New York Times, A1, March 15, 2002.groups of California highways and …nds that the group with higher tra¢c density has substantially
higher accident rates, suggesting an elasticity of the number of crashes with respect to aggregate
driving of 1.5. We do not know, however, whether these groups of highways were otherwise
comparable apart from tra¢c density, or whether they are representative of roadways more generally
and can provide a helpful prediction of what would happen if overall tra¢c density increased. In
fact, if road expenditures are rational, then roads with more tra¢c will be better planned and better
built in order to yield smoother tra¢c ‡ow and fewer accidents: as a result a cross-sectional study
could considerably understate the rise in accident risk with density on a given roadway. Another
di¢culty is that since Vickrey’s data contains no measure of accident severity, his comparison leaves
open the possibility that accidents become more frequent with higher density but that congestion
causes accidents to be less severe, so that on balance the accident externality is smaller than
suggested or even negative. Alternatively, his data could considerably understate the externality
if there are more vehicles involved in each accident when tra¢c density is higher, and this leads to
higher costs per accident. These limitations are common to all the transportation literature on the
e¤ect of tra¢c density on accident rates that we have surveyed (e.g., Turner and Thomas [1986],
Gwynn [1967], Lundy [1965], and Belmont [1953]).5
Edlin [2003] and Dougher and Hogarty [1994] take a di¤erent approach, doing cross-state com-
parisons instead of cross-road comparisons and using insurance premiums as a proxy for accident
costs (or as a variable of interest in its own right). Their regressions suggest that accident exter-
nalities, or speaking more precisely “insurance externalities,” are approximately half as large as a
simple theoretical model suggests.6 Like Vickrey, however, their cross-sectional data means that
they are unable to account for the possibility that states with higher tra¢c density could be sys-
5Most of the papers we have surveyed in the transportation literature estimate the rate of increase of accidents
with driving, a framework that does not admit accident externalities. A few papers such as the one cited above
include quadratic or higher powers on the quantity of driving, or compare accidents/vehicle mile on roads with
di¤erent tra¢c density. Although these papers do not state their results in terms of externalities, they all provide
support for positive accident externalities.
6Dougher and Hogarty [1994] do not directly concern themselves with accident externalities. They study whether
insurance rates rise with the amount of driving per person. One term in their regression can, however, be interpreted
as estimating the accident externality.
4tematically more (or less) dangerous than states with low tra¢c density for reasons apart from the
direct e¤ects of tra¢c density. For example, cross-sectional estimates could be biased downward if
low-tra¢c states tend to have dangerous mountainous roads; or contrarywise could be biased up-
ward if the safe ‡at roads of western Kansas are more typical of low-tra¢c states. Cross-sectional
estimates could also be biased downward by safety expenditures (on roads or otherwise) in high
tra¢c states - this “bias” in the measure of externality might be addressed if accident prevention
costs were added to accident costs.
This study is an attempt to provide better estimates of the size (and sign) of the accident
externality from driving. To begin, we choose a dependent variable, insurance rates, that is
dollar-denominated and captures both accident frequency and severity; we also analyze insurer
costs as a dependent variable. Our central question is whether one person’s driving increases
other people’s insurance rates. We use panel data from 1987-1995 on insurance premiums, tra¢c
density, aggregate driving, and various control variables including malt alcohol consumption and
precipitation. Our basic strategy is to estimate the extent to which an increase in tra¢c density
in a given state increases (or decreases) average insurance premiums. Increases in tra¢c density
can be caused by increases in the number of people who drive or by increases in the amount of
driving each person does. To the extent that the external costs at these two margins di¤er, our
results provide a weighted average of these two costs. These regressions provide a measure of the
insurance externality of driving.
We …nd that tra¢c density increases accident costs substantially whether measured by insurance
rates or insurer costs. Moreover, the e¤ect of an increase in density is highest in high-tra¢c states.
If congestion eventually reverses this trend, it is only at tra¢c densities beyond those in our sample.
Our estimates suggest that a typical extra driver raises others’ insurance rates (by increasing tra¢c
density) by the most in high tra¢c density states. In California, a very high-tra¢c state, we
estimate that a typical additional driver increases the total insurance premiums that others pay
5by roughly $2231 §$549.7 In contrast, we estimate that others’ insurance premiums are actually
lowered slightly in Montana, a very low-tra¢c state, but the result is statistically and economically
insigni…cant: -$16§48. These estimates of accident externalities are only for insurance costs and
do not include the cost of injuries that are uncompensated or undercompensated by insurance, nor
other accident costs such as tra¢c delays after accidents.
Although we chose premiums and loss costs because they implicity include crash frequency and
crash severity e¤ects, it would be interesting to decompose these two e¤ects. Unfortunately our
decomposition is statistically insigni…cant. Our point estimates suggest that increases in tra¢c
density appear to consistently increase accident frequency. On the other hand, our point estimates
suggest that the severity of accidents may fall somewhat with increases in density in low density
states; while in high density states severity rises with increases in density. Severity here includes
only insured costs per crash. As we said, both the severity externality and the frequency externality
are statistically insigni…cant, and it is only when the two externalities are combined (as they should
be) that we uncover statistically signi…cant externalities.
The principle example of underinsured accident costs is fatalities. We also therefore study the
fatalities externality. In particular, do fatalities per mile decline or increase with tra¢c density?
Our regressions do not give a de…nitive answer to this question, as our fatality externality estimates
are not statistically signi…cant. Our point estimates suggest that in low density states increases
in tra…c density may lower fatality rates, whereas in high density states increases in density raise
fatality rates.
None of our externality estimates distinguish the size of externality by the type of vehicle or the
type of driver. We …nd average externalities, and speci…c externalities are apt to vary substantially.
White [2002], for example, …nds that SUV’s damage other vehicles much more than lighter vehicles.8
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a framework for
determining the extent of accident externalities based upon Edlin’s [1999] theoretical model of
7Here we report estimates derived from speci…cation 12, as described subsequently.
8White is not studying the e¤ects of extra driving, but rather the e¤ects of switching vehicle types.
6vehicle accidents. Section 3 discusses our data. Section 4 reports our estimation results. Section
5 presents a state-by-state analysis of accident externalities. Section 6 decomposes the externality
into accident frequency and accident severity e¤ects. Section 7 explores the e¤ects of tra¢c density
on fatality rates. Finally, Section 8 discusses the policy implications of our results and directions
for future research.
2T h e F r a m e w o r k
Let r equal the expected accident costs per vehicle. (For the sake of simplicity of discussion, consider
a world where vehicles and drivers come in matched pairs.) A simple statistical-mechanics model
of accidents would have the rate r determined as follows:
r = c1 + c2
M
L
= c1 + c2D (1)
where
M= aggregate vehicle-miles driven per year by all vehicles combined;
L = total lane miles in the region; and
D = tra¢c density = M
L :
The …rst term represents the expected rate at which a driver incurs cost from one-vehicle ac-
cidents, while the second term, c2D, represents the cost of two-vehicle accidents. Two-vehicle
accidents increase with tra¢c density because they can only occur when two vehicles are in prox-
imity. This particular functional form can be derived under the assumptions that (1) a two-vehicle
accident occurs with some constant probability q (independent of tra¢c density) whenever two
vehicles are in the same location; (2) driving locations are drawn independently from the L lane-
miles of possible locations; and (3) that drivers do not vary the amount of their driving with tra¢c
density. (See Edlin [2003]).9 It can also be viewed as a reasonable reduced form. At the end of
9To the extent that tra¢c locations are not drawn uniformly the “relevant” tra¢c density …gure will di¤er (and
be higher) than
M
L . This actually only changes the coe¢cient c2.
7section 4, we will also estimate a model that abandons “assumption” (3) by normalizing accident
costs per mile driven instead of per vehicle as the variable r does.
If we extend this model to consider accidents where the proximity of three vehicles is required,
we have:
r = c1 + c2D + c3D2; (2)
where the quadratic term accounts for the likelihood that two other vehicles are in the same location
at the same time.
These are the two basic equations that we estimate. As we pointed out in the introduction,
however, it is far from obvious that in practice the coe¢cients c1;c 2;c 3 are all positive. In particular,
it seems quite likely that such an accident model can go wrong because the probability or severity of
an accident when two or several vehicles meet could ultimately begin to fall at high tra¢c densities
because tra¢c will slow down.
An average person pays the average accident cost r either in the form of an insurance premium
or by bearing accident risk. The accident externality from driving results because a driver increases
tra¢c density and thereby increases accident costs per driver. Although the increase in D from
a single driver will only a¤ect r minutely, when multiplied by all the drivers who must pay r,t h e
e¤ect could be substantial. For exerting this externality, the driver does not pay under any of the
existing tort systems.
If there are N vehicles/driver pairs in the region under consideration (a state in our data), then
the external cost is:
external marginal cost per mile of driving =( N ¡ 1)
µ
dr
dM
¶
=( N ¡ 1)
·
c2
L
+2 c3
M
L2
¸
: (3)
An average driver/vehicle pair drives ¹ m = M
N miles per year, so that the external cost of a
typical driver/vehicle is given by
8external marginal cost per vehicle ¼ ¹ m(N ¡ 1)
dr
dM
¼ (c2D +2 c3D2): (4)
(The …rst approximation holds since any single driver contributes very little to overall tra¢c density
so that the marginal cost given by equation (3) is a good approximation of the cost of each of the
¹ m miles she drives; the second approximation holds when N is large because then N=(N ¡ 1) ¼ 1
so that ¹ m(N ¡ 1) ¼ M.)
The interpretation of these externalities is simple. If someone stops driving or reduces her
driving, then not only does she su¤er lower accident losses, but other drivers who would otherwise
have gotten into accidents with her, su¤er lower accident losses as well.
In this model of accident externalities, all drivers are equally pro…cient. In reality, some people
are no doubt more dangerous drivers than others, and so the size of the externality will vary
across drivers. Our regression estimates are for the marginal external cost of a typical or average
driver. We will return to the subject of driver heterogeneity when we discuss the implications of
our analysis. The main implication of driver heterogeneity is that the potential bene…t from a
Pigouvian tax that accounts for this heterogeneity exceeds what one would derive from this paper’s
estimates.
3D a t a
We have constructed a panel data set with aggregate observations by state and by year. The Data
Appendix gives exact sources and speci…c notes. Table 1 provides summary statistics.
Our primary accident cost variable is average state insurance rates per vehicle, rst, for private
passenger vehicles for both collision and liability coverages. These rates are collected by year, t,
and by state, s, by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. Our second accident cost
variable is an Insurer Cost Series that we construct from loss cost data collected by the Insurance
Research Council. The loss cost data LC represents the average amount of payouts per year per
9insured car for Bodily Injury (BI), Property Damage (PD) and Personal Injury Protection (PIP)
from claims paid by insurers to accident victims. LCst is substantially smaller than average
premiums r for two reasons: …rst, non-payout expenses such as salary expense and returns to
capital are excluded; and second, several types of coverage are excluded. Despite its lack of
comprehensiveness, this loss cost data has one feature that is valuable for our study. It is a direct
measure of accident costs, and should therefore respond to changes in driving and tra¢c density
without the lags that insurance premiums might be subject to, to the extent that such changes in
tra¢c density were unpredictable to the insurance companies. We therefore “gross up” loss costs
in order to make them comparable in magnitude to premiums, by constructing an Insurer Cost
series as follows:
e rst = LCst
P
i rsi P
i LCsi
; (5)
where s i n d e x e ss t a t e sa n di indexes years. This series represents what premiums would have been
had companies known their loss costs in advance.
Both premiums and Insurer Cost data have the advantage over crash data that they are dollar-
denominated and therefore re‡ect both crash frequency and crash severity. This feature is important
if one is concerned about the e¤ect of tra¢c density on accident costs, because the number of cars
per accident (and hence crash severity) could increase as people drive more and tra¢c density
increases.
The average cost for both collision and liability insurance across all states in 1995 was $619
per vehicle, a substantial …gure that represents roughly 2% of gross product per capita. Average
insurance rates vary substantially among states: in New Jersey, for example, the average cost is
$1032 per insured car year, whereas in North Dakota the cost is $350 per insured car year.
Our main explanatory variable is Tra¢c Density (Dst = Mst
Lst ), where Mst is the total vehicle
miles travelled and Lst is the total lane miles in state s and year t. The units for tra¢c density
are vehicles/lane-year and can be understood as the number of vehicles crossing a given point on a
10typical lane of road over a one year period. Data on vehicle-miles comes from the U.S. Department
of Transportation, which collects it from states. Methods vary and involve both statistical sampling
with road counters and driving models.
We are concerned that the mileage data may have measurement error and that the year-to-
year changes in M on which we base our estimates could therefore have substantial measurement
errors. To correct for possible measurement errors, we instrument density with the number of
registered vehicles and with the number of licensed drivers. Although these variables may also
have measurement error, vehicle mile data are based primarily on road count data and gasoline
consumption (not on registered vehicles and licensed drivers) so it seems safe to assume that these
errors are orthogonal.
Tra¢c density like premiums varies substantially both among states and over time. In addition
to tra¢c density, we introduce several control variables that seem likely to a¤ect insurance costs:
state- and time-…xed e¤ects; (we include two separate state-liability …xed e¤ects in each of the
three states that switch their liability system (tort, add-on, and no-fault) over our time period;10
malt-alcohol beverage consumption per capita (malt-alcoholbeverage per cap.);a v e r a g ec o s tt o
community hospitals per patient per day (hosp. cost); percentage of male population between 15
and 24 years old (% young male pop.); real gross state product per capita (real gross prd. per cap.);
yearly rainfall (precipitation); and yearly snowfall (snowfall).
We introduce malt-alcoholbeverage per cap. because accident risk might be sensitive to alcohol
consumption: 57.3 % of accident fatalities in 1982 and 40.9 % in 1996 were alcohol-related.11 We
include %y o u n gm a l ep o p .because the accident involvement rate for male licensed drivers under
25 was 15% per year, while only 7% for older male drivers.12 We use hosp. cost as another
control variable since higher hospital costs in certain states would increase insurance cost and
10In states with traditional tort systems, accident victims can sue a negligent driver and recover damages. Injured
parties in no-fault jurisdictions depend primarily on …rst-party insurance coverage because these jurisdictions limit
the right to sue, usually requiring either that a monetary threshold or a ”verbal” threshold be surpassed before suit
is permitted. Add-on states require auto insurers to o¤er …rst-party personal injury protection (PIP) coverage, as
in no-fault states, without restricting the right to sue.
11Tra¢c Safety Facts Table 13
12Tra¢c Safety Facts Table 59 (pg. 94)
11hence insurance premiums there. Likewise, real gross prd. per cap. could have a signi…cant e¤ect
on insurance premiums in a given state. On the one hand, more a­uent people can a¤ord safer
cars (e.g. cars with air bags), which could reduce insurance premiums; on the other hand, they may
tend to buy more expensive cars and have higher lost wages when injured, which would increase
premiums. Finally, we incorporate precipitation and snowfall since weather conditions in a given
state could a¤ect accident risk and are apt to correlate with the driving decision.
Our panel data only extends back until 1987, because the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners does not provide earlier premiums data.
4 Estimation
Here, we estimate 11 speci…cations of Equations (1) and (2) and report these in Tables 2 and 3,
together with three …rst-stage regressions.
As a preliminary attempt to estimate the impact of tra¢c density on insurance rates, we run
the following cross-sectional regression with 1995 data:
rs = c1 + c2Ds + b ¢ xs + "s; (6)
where xs represents our control variables. This regression yields an estimate of ^ c2 =1 :1 ¤ 10¡04 §
3:8 ¤ 10¡05, as reported in Column 1 of Table 2. (Throughout this discussion, we report point
estimates followed by “§” one standard deviation, where the standard deviation is calculated
robust to heteroskedosticity.)
These cross-sectional results do not account for the likely correlation of state-speci…c factors
such as the tort system or road quality with tra¢c density, as we pointed out in the introduction.
For this reason, we use panel data to estimate the following model:
rst = ®s + °t + c1 + c2Dst + b ¢ xs + "st (7)
where the indexes s and t denote state and time respectively. This speci…cation includes state
12…xed e¤ects ®s and time …xed e¤ects °t, so that our identi…cation of the estimated e¤ect of increases
in tra¢c density comes from comparing changes in tra¢c density to changes in aggregate insurance
premiums in a given state, controlling for overall time trends. Including time …xed e¤ects helps us
to control for technological change such as the introduction of air bags or any other shocks that hit
states relatively equally. States that switch from a tort system to a no-fault system or vice versa
are given two di¤erent …xed e¤ects, one while under each system.
Speci…cation 2 (i.e., Column 2) reveals that above average increases in tra¢c density in states are
associated with above average increases in insurance rates. This speci…cation yields substantially
larger estimates than the pure cross-sectional regressions in speci…cation (1) – a coe¢cient of
.00036 § .00016 compared with .00011 § .000038. There are several potential reasons why we
would expect the cross section to be biased down. In particular, states with high accident costs
would rationally spend money to make roads safer. Since this e¤ect will work to o¤set the impact
of tra¢c density, we would expect a cross-sectional regression to understate the e¤ect of density
holding other factors constant. Extra safety expenditures can, of course, be made in a given state
in reaction to increased tra¢c density from year to year, but one might expect such reactions to
be signi…cantly delayed, so that the regression coe¢cient would be closer to the ceterus parabus
…gure we seek. Likewise, downward biases result if states switch to liability systems that insure a
s m a l l e rp e r c e n t a g eo fl o s s e si nr e a c t i o nt oh i g hi n s u r a n c ec o s t s .
Measurement errors in the vehicle miles travelled variable M could bias the tra¢c density
coe¢cient toward 0 in both speci…cations (1) and (2); relatively small errors in Mst could lead to
substantial errors in year-to-year changes in miles, which form the basis of our estimates. The rest
of our regressions we therefore report in pairs —an OLS together with an IV that uses licensed
drivers per lane-mile and registered vehicles per lane-mile as instruments for tra¢c density. As
justi…ed above in the Data section, we assume that any measurement error in these variables is
uncorrelated with errors in measuring tra¢c density.13 These variables do not enter our accident
13This technique does not ”cure” the bias toward 0 that would result if L is measured with error.
13model directly, because licensed drivers and vehicles by themselves get into (almost) no accidents.
A licensed driver only can increase the accident rate of others to the extent that she drives, and
vehicles, only to the extent that they are driven. On the other hand, these variables seem likely to
be highly correlated with tra¢c density. Column 6 of Table 2 reports the results of the …rst-stage
regression. It reveals that the density of licensed drivers and registered cars are in fact highly
positively correlated and predictive of tra¢c density as expected.
The instruments substantially increase our estimate of ^ c2, as one would expect if errors in
variables were a problem for OLS. The estimates do not change so much, though, that with a
Hausman exogeneity test we could reject the hypothesis that both OLS and IV are consistent.14
The test suggests that both might be consistent. The Hausman test is unfortunately not designed,
however, to test our actual null hypothesis which is that IV is consistent and OLS is biased toward
0;15 this hypothesis …nds some (limited) support from the coe¢cient estimates. At the expense of
the possibility of some ine¢ciency in our estimates, we therefore stick to our priors and focus on
IV estimates, though we report both OLS and IV in Tables 2 and 3. If in fact there are errors
in the miles variable (a possibility that the Hausman test is not designed to reject), then we are
probably better o¤ for focusing on the IV estimates. The estimate in Speci…cation (3) of Table 2
of the density e¤ect is .0014, roughly three times larger than Speci…cation (2).
Our approach and results should be compared to the studies in the transportation literature.
The transportation studies we have found are cross-sectional, comparing crash rates on roads with
high and low tra¢c density. Many studies seem to study variants of equation (1) without the
density term on which we have focussed,16 but we found four that estimate a form of equation
(1) that includes the density term (Thomas and Turner [1986], Lundy [1965], McKerral [1962],
and Belmont [1953]). The coe¢cients in these studies (once converted to the units in Table 2)
14The Hausman exogeneity test statistic is 17.3 for the linear model, comparing speci…cations (2) and (3), and is
distributed as chi-squared with 61 degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis that both IV and OLS are consistent,
but OLS is more e¢cient. The test statistic comparing speci…cations (7) and (8) is 30.
15The Hausman test tests the null hypothesis that both IV and OLS are consistent against the alternative hypothesis
that only IV is consistent; in contrast our null is that only IV is consistent.
16For example, some regress accidents per mile of road on tra¢c ‡ow.
14range from :0001 to :0003, assuming that the $/crash is constant and equal to the average level in
our sample. One reason that these cross-sectional crash studies may have lower estimates than
our estimate of .0014 is that the severity per crash could increase with tra¢c density because the
average number of involved vehicles per crash should grow. As we discuss later, we attempt to
decompose our externality estimates into the e¤ect of tra¢c density on crash frequency and on
crash severity. We …nd that in high tra¢c density states increases in density substantially increase
severity as measured by insurance expenses per crash.
The cross-sectional studies cited above may also be biased downward for reasons similar to
Speci…cation (1) (a cross-sectional regression with a roughly comparable estimate). Roads may be
built better and safer in areas with high tra¢c density, either to reduce accidents or to improve the
driving experience. People may also avoid driving on dangerous roads, causing those roads to have
low tra¢c density. Put di¤erently people may be attracted to live near safer roads where tra¢c
‡ows smoothly and driving is easy, or arrange their driving to be on such roads. Measurement
error may also lower coe¢cients in these regressions, much as they do in our Speci…cation 2, and
none of these studies used an instrumental variables approach. (For example, road counters may
only have measured density on certain days, rather than for the whole period where accidents were
measured.) Finally, these studies are all of high speed highways where accident costs per crash are
probably substantially larger than our average.17 Our estimates would also be higher if the costs of
increased density were more severe for the non-highway driving which we include. To summarize,
our results suggest that the cost of increased density are much higher than one would have inferred
from transportation studies, but not unreasonably so given the many reasons one might expect the
methodologies to yield di¤erent results.
Table 3 gives regression results from our quadratic density model, which can be viewed as a
structural model of one-, two-, and three-vehicle accidents. An alternative view of these spec-
i…cations is that they test whether the marginal e¤ect of increased tra¢c density is greater in
17Recall that to convert their crash coe¢cients to $, we multiplied by $/crash. We used the average …gure for
dollars per crash since we did not have a …gure speci…c to highways.
15high-density states as would be suggested by the multi-vehicle accident model, or lower as might
be the case if congestion ultimately lowered accident rates.
Both the instrumented and OLS speci…cations in Table 3 reveal the same pattern. In particular,
the density coe¢cient becomes negative and the density-squared coe¢cient positive and signi…cant.
(The density coe¢cient is not signi…cant in Speci…cation (7).) These two e¤ects balance to make
the e¤ect of increases in density on insurance rates small and of indeterminant sign in low tra¢c
states and positive, substantial, and statistically signi…cant in high tra¢c states.
These regressions provide strong evidence that tra¢c density increases the risk of driving, and
that it does so at an increasing rate. Hence, high tra¢c density states have very high accident
costs and commensurately large external marginal costs not borne by the driver or his insurance
carrier. Congestion may eventually lower the external marginal accident costs, but such an e¤ect
is probably at higher density levels than observed in our sample. Belmont [1953] indicates that
crash rates fall only when roads have more than 650 vehicles per lane per hour, which corresponds
to nearly 6 million vehicles per lane per year, a …gure well above the highest average tra¢c density
in our sample.
The extra costs from increases in tra¢c density may, of course, not be fully re‡ected in premi-
ums; these costs may, at least in the short term, lower pro…ts or increase losses in the insurance
industry. This possibility could bias our estimates of the externality from tra¢c density downward.
Instead of trying to handle this by introducing lagged density as an explanatory variable, we use
our Insurer Cost Series in place of premiums. This series, described above in the data section, is
formed from data on selected companies’ loss costs (payouts) on selected coverages.
Columns (9) and (10) revealed the same pattern as the premiums regressions, and similar
magnitudes. The similarity of magnitudes suggests that insurers can accurately forecast the risk
that comes from tra¢c density. (Otherwise, one might expect the Insurer Cost Series to yield
much larger estimates). The consistency of results using our Insurer Cost Series lends us added
con…dence in our …ndings.
16Our framework, whether using insurer cost or premiums, still su¤ers, however, from potential
biases. These biases ‡ow from normalizing insurance costs on a per-vehicle basis. Accident cost
per vehicle will depend upon the amount the average vehicle is driven; the more it is driven, the
higher will be costs. If miles per vehicle in a state rise, this could drive up both tra¢c density
and insurance premiums per vehicle without any externality e¤ect. Hence, our estimates might be
biased up. On the other hand, if tra¢c density rises because more people become drivers, then
each person will …nd driving less attractive and drive less, reducing her risk exposure. This would
bias our externality estimate down, and could lead to a low density coe¢cient estimate even with
a large externality. These potential biases o¤set each other, so one might hope that our estimates
are roughly correct.
Both biases are removed if we try a di¤erent speci…cation and normalize aggregate statewide
premiums by M instead of by the number of insured vehicles. Accordingly, columns (11) and (12)
report estimates of a variant of equation (2) in which we have premiums per vehicle mile driven,
p, instead of premiums per vehicle driven, r, on the left-hand-side. The estimates in speci…cation
(12), like our other estimates, have a positive and signi…cant coe¢cient on density squared; the
estimates are naturally much smaller in absolute value because once normalized by miles driven,
the left-hand-side variable is roughly 10¡4 smaller than in the other regressions. Estimates from the
premiums per-mile speci…cation are our preferred estimates because they avoid the potential biases
from variations in miles driven per vehicle. As we see in the next section, this speci…cation leads
to the largest estimates of the externality e¤ect. This suggests that the largest bias in regression
(8) is the downward bias from more drivers leading to less driving per driver.
5 The External Costs of Accidents
Here, we compute the extent to which the typical marginal driver increases others’ insurance
premiums in a state. For speci…cations (3), (8) and (10), equation (4) gives the externality on a
per-vehicle basis. We convert this …gure to a per-licensed-driver basis by multiplying by the ratio
17of registered vehicles to licensed drivers in a given state.18 The resulting …gure implicitly assumes
a self-insurance cost borne by uninsured drivers equal to the insurance cost of insured drivers.19
Extra driving and extra drivers impose large accident costs on others in states with high tra¢c
density like New Jersey, Massachusetts, and California, according to our estimates. In California,
for example, our estimates range from a level of $1271 § 490 in the linear model to $2432 in the
quadratic model using Insurer Costs. An additional driver doing the average amount of driving
could increase others’ insurance costs by .015 cents/vehicle or in statewide aggregate by $2432 §
$670. This external marginal cost is in addition to the already substantial internalized cost of $744
in premiums that an average driver paid in 1996 for liability and collision coverage in California.
In contrast, in South Dakota, a state with roughly 1/15th the tra¢c density of California, our
estimates of the external cost are quite low, ranging from $¡60 § 28 to $94 § 36.T h e m a r g i n a l
accident externality is positive in most states according to our estimates. In the linear model, the
externality is positive in all states. As a comparative matter, external marginal costs in high tra¢c
density states are much larger than either insurance costs or gasoline expenditures.
Our external cost estimates are large in high density states such as Massachusetts, New Jersey,
California and Hawaii, but not unexpectedly so. Consider that nationally, there are nearly three
drivers involved per crash on average. According to the accident model in Section 2, this would
suggest that the marginal accident cost of driving would typically be three times the average, and
that the external marginal cost would be twice the average. Hence, we might expect that a 1%
increase in driving could raise costs by 3%.20 In California, a 1% increase in driving raises insurance
costs by roughly 2.5%, according to Speci…cation (3), our linear model, and by 4%, according to
18In deriving equation (4) we did not distinguish between vehicles and drivers, assuming that they were matched.
Because our data on r is in per-vehicle units, applying equation (4) with our estimates of coe¢cients c2 and c3 yields
external costs per vehicle.
19This …gure is an overestimate to the extent that insured drivers buy uninsured motorist coverage, and thereby
bear a disproportionate fraction of overall costs.
20A few words of explanation are called for here. If accidents require the coincidence of three cars in the same place
at the same time, then r = c3D
2 and external marginal costs equal 2c3D
2. Internalized marginal costs are c3D
2,
so that total marginal cost is 3c3D
2. If there were no external marginal costs, then a 1 percent increase in driving
would increase costs by 1 percent (the internalized …gure). External costs are twice as large as internalized costs in
this example.
18Speci…cation (12). The linear model suggests that in almost all states a 1% increase in driving
raises accident costs by substantially more than 1%. (The lowest …gure for the linear model is
North Dakota where the estimate is a 1+8 1 =363 = 1:2% increase in costs.)21 In the quadratic
models, low density states have small, negative, and statistically insigni…cant externality costs.
6 Decomposing the externality into frequency and severity e¤ects
Tra¢c density could increase insurance premiums by increasing the frequency of crashes or by
increasing the severity as measured by premiums per crash (or, of course by both). Here, we
explore the relative importance of these two avenues.
To do so, let
C = t h en u m b e ro fc r a s h e s ( 8 )
and (9)
A = insurance premiums (10)
We can decompose premiums per vehicle mile driven p = A
M as follows
A
M
=
C
M
A
C
(11)
We estimate equations
Cst
Mst = ¯s + ±t + c4 + c5Dst + c6D2
st + b ¢ xs + "st (*)
Ast
Cst = %s + ¾t + c7 + c8Dst + c9D2
st + ´ ¢ xs + ust: (**)
>From expressions (*), we can compute the impact of an extra driver driving the average
number of miles on the number of crashes: Column 3 of Table 5 reports what the impact of this
21The …gure is calculated as follows. The marginal external cost is 83. The marginal internal cost (which is just
the average cost) is given by premiums and is $363. Hence, the elasticity of accidents with respect to driving is
363+81
363 =1 :2%
19increase in crash frequency would be on total premiums if premiums per crash remained constant.
These …gures can be interpreted as an estimate of the external marginal cost from increasing crash
frequency. Thus a typical driver in Pennsylvania increases crash frequency enough to raise others’
premiums by $288/year according to our point estimate even if crash severity remained …xed. Our
point estimates suggest that crash frequency appears to increase with density at all density levels,
though these estimates are not statistically signi…cant.
The impact of a typical driver on insurance premiums though increases or decreases in severity
(Ast
Cst) can be found from (**) as follows
Mst
#Drivers in states s at time t
Cst
dAst
Cst
dMst
=
·
c8
lst
+2 c9
Mst
l2
st
¸
Cst
Mst
# Drivers in state s at time t
(12)
Column 5 of Table 5 gives external marginal cost from increase in crash severity. At low tra¢c
density, these …gures are somewhat negative. In high density states the …gures become positive and
economically substantial. In Massachusetts, the estimated frequency externality is $841/driver §
987 and the estimated severity externality is $702 § 659. Unfortunately, our externality estimates
for both frequency and severity are not statistically signi…cant. Only when the two are combined
together (as they should be to form a true externality estimate) as we did previously do we get
statistically signi…cant e¤ects.
7 Fatalities
The Urban Institute has estimated that total accident costs are substantially in excess of insured
costs. If these costs behave as insured costs do, the true externalities would far exceed our
estimates. One of the biggest underinsured costs is fatalities. Viscusi [1993] estimates the cost
of a life as $6 million, and yet few auto insurance policies cover more than $500,000. The bulk
of fatality costs are therefore not in our insurance data. However, fatality data is separately
available. We therefore estimate Fst
Mst = ±s+®t+c10+c11Dst+c12D2
st+c13¢xs+¹st; where Fst are
20auto fatalities in state s in year t. We estimate this with instrumental variables, and from these
estimates we can calculate the external marginal fatality cost. Column 3 of Table 6 gives these
…gures. Unfortunately none of the …gures is statistically signi…cant so nothing de…nite is learned
from this exercise. The pattern of point estimates is similar to that for premiums - negative and
small in low density states, positive and large in high density states.
8 Implications
For speci…cations (3), (10), and (12), even in states with only moderate tra¢c density such as
Arizona or Georgia, the insurance externalities we estimate here are substantial and exceed exist-
ing taxes on gasoline, which are designed largely to cover road repairs and construction. These
externalities dwarf existing taxes in states with high tra¢c density such as California in all spec-
i…cations. The result of not charging for accident externalities is too much driving and too many
accidents, at least from the standpoint of economic e¢ciency.
The straightforward way to address the large external marginal costs in certain states is to
levy a substantially increased charge, either per mile, per driver, or per gallon so that people pay
something closer to the true social costs that they impose when they drive. If each state charged
our estimated external marginal cost for each mile driven or each new driver, the total national
revenue would be $140 billion/year, neglecting the resulting reductions in driving.22 This …gure
exceeds all state income tax revenues combined. In California alone, revenues would be $45 billion,
well in excess of California’s income tax revenue. New Jersey, another high tra¢c state could
likewise gather much more revenue from an appropriate accident externality tax that it does from
its income tax: $12 billion compared to $5 billion. Of course, the number of drivers and the amount
of driving would decline signi…cantly with such tax, and that would be the point of the tax, because
less driving would result in fewer accidents.
The true extent of accident externalities is probably substantially in excess of our estimates
22Here, we use the estimates from Speci…cation 12.
21because we neglected two important categories of losses. In particular, we did not include the costs
of tra¢c delays following accidents, nor did we include damages and injuries to those in accidents
when these losses are not covered by insurance. This latter omission could be quite substantial.23
According to one fairly comprehensive Urban Institute [1991] study, the total cost of accidents
(excluding congestion) is over $350 billion, substantially over the roughly $100 billion of insured
accident cost. If these uninsured accident costs behave like the insured costs we have studied, then
accident externality costs could be 3.5 times as large as we have estimated here. Externality Costs
for California might be $7000 per driver per year.
Of the several taxes that could be imposed to correct for accident externalities, gasoline taxes
stand out as administratively expedient since states already have such taxes. However, such taxes
have the potential disadvantage that fuel e¢cient vehicles would pay lower accident externality
fees, even though they may not impose substantially lower accident costs (in the extreme, an elec-
tric vehicle would pay no accident externality charge).24 Environmental concerns may be a sound
reason to levy a tax on gasoline, but once such taxes are su¢cient to address environmental exter-
nalities, further gasoline taxes may not be the most e¢cient way to address accident externalities.
Traditional gasoline taxes also have the disadvantage that good and bad drivers are charged the
same amount, even though the accident frequency and hence the accident externality of bad drivers
could be considerably higher.
An alternative to gasoline taxes would be to address accident externalities by levying a corre-
spondingly large tax on insurance premiums. In California, the tax might be roughly 300%. (If
we consider, for example, the estimate of $2234 for the external marginal cost from speci…cation
12, and compare this …gure to $744, the internal cost, we would conclude that the tax should be
2234
744 = 300%.) If uninsured externality costs are in fact 3.5 times insurance costs, the tax should
23Some types of losses and some drivers are uninsured. For example, the pain and su¤ering of an at-fault driver
is generally not insured, and in no-fault states, pain and su¤ering may go uncompensated for nonnegligent drivers
as well. Moreover, there is substantial evidence that insurance settlements are often less than even pecuniary losses
(Dewees et al., 1996).
24This e¤ect is not entirely unwarranted, since fuel e¢ciency is related to vehicle weight, and the external damages
from accidents may be as well. Consider, e.g., a sport utility vehicle.
22be closer to 1000%. Such a tax would have several advantages over gasoline taxes. Insurance com-
panies charge bad drivers (e.g., young males or those with many past accidents) considerably more
than good drivers, and an externality tax calculated as a percentage of insurance premiums would
therefore be commensurately larger for bad drivers. Insurance companies also rate by territories,
typically charging substantially more in high tra¢c density areas. Basing externality taxes on
insurance premiums, therefore, would considerably re…ne the externality tax compared with a uni-
form state-wide tax per gallon. A substantial potential drawback with taxing insurance premiums
is that the primary incentive such a tax would yield (at least initially) would be at the decision
margin of whether to become a driver, and not of how much to drive. Since existing insurance
premiums are not very sensitive to actual driving (see Edlin [2003]), people who decide to drive
despite the tax, once they have paid the fee, will feel free to drive a lot. Other people, who might be
willing to pay high per-mile rates but who only want to drive a very few miles, may be ine¢ciently
discouraged from driving at all.
On the other hand, large taxes on insurance premiums would give insurance companies much
larger incentives to adopt per-mile premium policies, or other premium schedules that are more
sensitive to actual driving done.25 Currently a …rm that quotes such premium schedules bears all
the costs of monitoring mileage, but gleans only a fraction of the bene…ts: as its insureds cut
back their driving, others avoid accidents (with them) and bene…t considerably. An appropriate
premium tax internalizes these tax e¤ects. Regardless of the form that premium schedules take,
if taxes are imposed through insurance premiums, states will need to become much more serious
about requiring insurance and enforcing these requirements.
In principle, accident charges should vary by roadway and time of day to account for changes
in tra¢c density. Technology may soon make such pricing cheap. In fact, Progressive Insurance is
already conducting experiments with such pricing in Texas using GPS technology to track location.
25The transaction cost of monitoring actual mileage has apparently fallen su¢ciently that Progressive Insurance
is now toward experimenting with distance-based insurance premiums for private passenger vehicles. Such policies
have been used for some time for commercial vehicles where the stakes are larger.
23However, most of the potential gains can be realized by pricing at average marginal cost instead of
exact marginal cost. E¤ective January 2002, Texas passed a law allowing insurance companies to
charge premiums at per-mile rates, converting the standard unit of coverage from the vehicle-year
to the vehicle-mile. A British …rm is also now experimenting with “pay as you drive” insurance.
26
Our research could also be used for decisions regarding the bene…ts of building an extra mile
of road in terms of accident reduction. If driving could be held constant,w ee s t i m a t et h a ta n
extra lane mile would reduce insurance costs by $120,000 per year in California by lowering tra¢c
density; Idaho, in contrast, saves nothing with the extra road. Of course, extra lanes will induce
extra driving and the accident and other costs of this extra driving should be subtracted from these
…gures – and driving bene…ts should be added – to arrive at net social bene…ts. Such adjustments
would not be necessary if appropriate Pigouvian taxes were already levied on driving.
Substantially more research on accident externalities from driving seems appropriate, particu-
larly given the apparent size of the external costs. There is substantial heterogeneity within states
in tra¢c density, so more re…ned data (such as county-level data or time-of-day data) would yield
more accurate estimates of the e¤ect of tra¢c density and correspondingly of external marginal
costs. In principle, it would also be instructive to dissagregate tra¢c density into its components
by the age of driver and by vehicle type. In particular, it would be useful to divide tra¢c density
by truck and non-truck; we did not do so because such data is only available on a comprehensive
basis since 1993.
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10 Data Appendix
Data Variables, Sources and Notes
Our panel data comes primarily from the Highway Statistics of Federal Highway Administra-
tion, National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), Insurance Research Council (IRC),
Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Census Bureau, the Statistical Ab-
stract of the United States,t h eGreen Book of National Association of Independent Insurers (NAII),
the Brewers’ Almanac o ft h eB e e rI n s t i t u t ea n dt h eWeather Almanac o ft h eG a l eG r o u p .
All dollar …gures are converted to 1996 real dollars.
1. rliability: ($/liability car-year). Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners,
State Average Expenditures & Premiums for Personal Automobile Insurance, (various years),
Table 7. The NAIC groups auto insurance coverages into three groups: liability, collision
and comprehensive.
2. rcollision: ($/collision car-year). Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners,
State Average Expenditures & Premiums for Personal Automobile Insurance, (various years),
Table 7. The NAIC groups auto insurance coverages into three groups: liability, collision
and comprehensive.
263. r: Average premiums ($/ insured car-year). Source: National Association of Insurance Com-
missioners, State Average Expenditures & Premiums for Personal Automobile Insurance,( v a r -
ious years), Table 7. Notes: This variable is the sum of rliability and rcollision:
4. LC : Average amount of loss per year per insured car for BI, PD, PIP claims. ($/vehicle-
year). Source: Insurance Research Council, Trends in Auto Injury Claims,1 9 9 5 ,A p p e n d i x
A.
5. e r: Insurer Cost Series constructed from loss costs as described in the Data Section. ($/car
years). .
6. M : Total Vehicle Miles Travelled (vehicle miles). Source: U.S. Department of Transporta-
tion, Federal Highway Adminstration, Highway Statistics, (various years), data for: 1984-
89,Table FI-1, data for: 1990-96,Table VM-2.
7. A: Total Insurance Premiums ($). Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners
[various years]
8. p: premiums per mile driven. Aggregate premiums are given by state and by year in National
Association of Insurance Commissioners [various years]. pst = Ast=Mst.
9. L : Estimated Lane Mileage (miles). Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal
Highway Adminstration, Highway Statistics, (various years), data for: 1984-89, Table HM-20
& Table HM-60, data for: 1990-96, Table HM-60.
10. D : Tra¢c Density (vehicle miles / lane miles). This variable is the ratio of M to L:
11. Licensed drivers. Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Adminstra-
tion, Highway Statistics, (various years), data for: 1984-94, Table DL-1A , data for: 1994-96,
Table DL-1C.
12. Registered vehicles (all motor vehicles = private + commercial + publicly owned). Source:
U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Adminstration, Highway Statistics,
(various years), Table MV-1.
13. Pindex: Fixed-Weighted Price Index for Gross Domestic Product. Source:U.S. Department
of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis web page, Regional Statistics, www.bea.doc.gov.
Notes: The base year is 1996 (i.e. Pindex =1 ,i fy e a r=1 9 9 6 ) .
14. pop: Population. Source:U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population, (various years),
www.census.gov/population/www/estimates/statepop.html.
15. malt-alcohol beverage per cap.: This …gure is the number of gallons of beer and other malted
alcoholic beverages consumed per capita each year.S o u r c e : U.S. Brewers’ Association, The
Brewers’ Almanac, (various years), Table 43 and Table 45.
16. real gross prd. per cap.: Real gross state product per capita (millions/person). Source: U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis web page, Regional Statistics, www.bea.doc.gov/bea/
Notes: The values reported by Bureau of Economic Analysis are chained weighted 1992 dol-
lars. We convert to 1996 dollars.
17. %y o u n gm a l ep o p . : % of male population between 15-24. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Census of Population, (various years), www.census.gov/population/www/estimates/statepop.html.
18. hosp.cost: Average cost to community hospitals per patient per day ($). Source:U . S .D e -
partment of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States (various years), Section on
“Health and Nutrition”.
2719. repair cost per veh.: Auto repair costs per registered vehicle ($/registered vehicle). Source:
National Association of Independent Insurers (NAII) Greenbook : A Compilation of Property-
Casualty Insurance Statistics, (various years).
20. % young male lic. drivers: % of male licensed drivers under 25. Source: U.S. Department of
Transportation, Federal Highway Adminstration, Highway Statistics, (various years), Table
DL-22.
21. precipitation: total annual precipitation (inches). Source: Wood, Richard A., ed., Weather
Almanac, Ninth Edition, 1999. Notes: We do not have aggregate weather data for the states.
Data was available for speci…c locations in each state instead of a state overall. Therefore
we use the data from the largest city/metropolitan area (in terms of its population) in every
state.27
22. snowfall: total annual snowfall (inches). Source: Wood, Richard A., ed., Weather Almanac,
Ninth Edition, 1999. Notes: Note on precipitation applies.
23. State Liability Systems: Dummy variables for no fault and add-on states. Source: Insurance
Research Council, Trends in Auto Injury Claims, 1995, Appendix A. Notes: No fault states
have laws that restrict the right to sue for minor auto injuries. Instead they substitute PIP
regardless of who was at fault. These states are: Colorado ,Connecticut (until 1/1/94), D.C,
Florida, Georgia (until 10/1/91), Hawaii, Kansas,Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Min-
nesota, New Jersey, N.Y. , N.Dakota, Penssylvania (until 10/1/84, then beginning 7/1/90),
Utah. Kentucky, NJ, PA are choice no-fault which means that vehicle owners can choose to
operate under no-fault or tort. Add-on states require auto insurers to o¤er PIP bene…ts, but
they do not restrict the right to pursue liability claim or lawsuit.These states are: Arkansas,
Connecticut (as of 1/1/94), Delaware, D.C (after 6/1/86), Maryland, PA (from 10/1/84 to
6/30/90), S. Dakota, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin, Washington.
27The only exceptions are Colorado, New Hampshire and Ohio.
28TABLE 1 - SUMMARY STATISTICS
Standard Standard
Variable Mean deviation Mean deviation
Premiums, r 522 139 619 161
(dollars/insured car-year)
Traffic density, D=M/L 264734 193298 319339 207067
(vehicle miles/lane miles-year)
Estimated Insurer costs, r~ 488 148 618 151
(dollars/car per year)
Malt-Alcohol Beverage per cap. 24 4 23 4
(gallons/person-year)
Real Gross Prd. per cap. 23590 5322 26898 4471
($/person-year)
% young male pop. 8 0 7 1
(percentage)
Hospital Cost 620 138 936 220
($/patient per day)
precipitation 33 14 34 15
(inches/year)
snowfall 25 24 37 36
(inches/year)
Notes:
1. All $ values are real 1996 dollars deflated with the fixed-weighted GDP deflator
1987 1995TABLE 2 - LINEAR INSURANCE MODEL
Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First Stage Regression
Regressors r r r Insurer Costs, r~ Insurer Costs, r~ traffic density, D
1995 1987-1995
(OLS) (OLS) (IV) (OLS) (IV)
traffic density, D 0.00011** 0.00036** 0.0014** 0.00058** 0.0019** N/A
(0.000038) (0.00016) (0.00054) (0.00028) (0.00078)
state dummies no yes yes yes yes yes
time dummies no yes yes yes yes yes
Malt-Alcohol Beverage per cap. 0.448 0.79 2.8 -2.04 0.43 -1337.54*
(1.52) (2.12) (2.59) (5.09) (5.34) (775.76)
Real Gross Prd. 2217.5 2463.41 -113 5373.5 2224.5 2798127**
per cap. (1947.2) (1834.28) (2538.5) (3331.5) (4094.35) (572450.6)
Hospital Cost 0.026 0.024 -0.051 -0.3 -0.4 50.94**
(0.035) (0.04) (0.056) (0.11) (0.13) (13.75)
% young male pop. 7.85 8.18 11.64 -4.98 -0.75 -3881.96
(10.73) (7) (8.24) (12.09) (12.71) (2726.3)
precipitation 0.26 -0.49 -0.53* 0.1 0.06 57.81
(0.38) (0.26) (0.28) (0.36) (0.37) (87.57)
snowfall 0.13 -0.12 -0.19 0.014 -0.07 83.04**
(0.16) (0.13) (0.14) (0.22) (0.23) (42.27)
registered vehicles 1777.67**
per lane-mile (400.36)
licensed drivers 3353.72**
per lane-mile (447.54)
Notes:
1. White's robust standard errors are reported below coefficients
2. IV uses as instruments registered vehicles per lane mile, licensed drivers per lane mile, 
time and state dummy variables and all the control variables.
3. *: 10% significant, **: 5% significant
1987-1995TABLE 3 - QUADRATIC INSURANCE RATE MODEL
Dependent Variable
First Stage Regressions
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Regressors r r Insurer Costs, r~ Insurer Costs, r~ Premiums per mile driven Premiums per mile driven D D^2
1987-1995
(OLS) (IV) (OLS) (IV) (OLS) (IV)
traffic density, D -0.00056* -0.0011** -0.0004 -0.00098 -1.14e-07** -3.81e-08 N/A N/A
(0.0003) (0.00046) (0.00054) (0.00075) (3.19e-08) (4.87e-08)
D^2 9.94E-10** 2.19E-09** 1.05E-09** 2.51E-09** 9.15e-14** 1.79e-13** N/A N/A
(3.57E-10) (5.23E-10) (5.81E-10) (6.02E-10) (3.56e-14) (5.26e-14)
state dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Malt-Alcohol Beverage per cap. 0.97 2.4 -1.84 -0.059 0.00024 .00057** -1057.66 -2.03E+09
(2.2) (2.75) (5.18) (5.5) (0.00018) (.00027) (778.56) (8.2E+08)
Real Gross Prd. 2968* 2036.5 5907.16* 4712.6 -0.082 -.43** 3072066** 1.39E+12
per cap. (1667) (1752.2) (3077.66) (3232.4) (0.16) (.2) (580328.4) (6.11E+11)
Hospital Cost 0.029 -0.0085 -0.3** -0.35** 7.85e-06** -2.9e-6 48.49** 4.13E+07**
(0.04) (0.053) (0.11) (0.13) (3.91e-06) (5.52e-6) (13.71) (1.44E+07)
% young male pop. 22.93** 42.68** 10.62 34.84** 0.00083 0.0026** -5991.6** -1.23E+10
(7.74) (10.54) (14.96) (16.41) (0.0007) (0.001) (2864.3) (3.02E+09)
precipitation -0.48* -0.48* 0.12 0.11 -0.000043** -.000048* 39.96 8.73E+07
(0.25) (0.27) (0.35) (0.36) (0.00002) (.000025) (87.29) (9.19E+07)
snowfall -0.15 -0.23 -0.017 -0.11 -0.000021* -.00003** 85.49** 9.96E+07**
(0.13) (0.15) (0.22) (0.23) (0.000011) (.000013) (42.03) (4.43E+07)
registered vehicles 2509.38** -1.95E+09
per lane-mile (872.14) (9.18E+08)
licensed drivers 5067.47** 1.92E+09
per lane-mile (1010) (1.06E+09)
(registered vehicles -8.523 4.79E+07
per lane-mile)^2 (9.3) (9.8E+06)
(licensed drivers -15.23* 1.07E+07
per lane-mile)^2 (9.18) (9.7E+06)
Notes:
1. White's robust standard errors are reported below coefficients
2. IV uses as instruments registered vehicles per lane mile, licensed drivers per lane mile, 
square of registered vehicles per lane mile, square of licensed drivers per lane mile,
time and state dummy variables and all the control variables.
3. *: 10% significant, **: 5% significant
1987-1995TABLE 4 - EXTERNAL ACCIDENT COST OF MARGINAL DRIVER
Linear Premiums per Vehicle Model
State Traffic Density r (insurance rates per vehicle) dollars/driver standard error dollars/driver standard error dollars/driver standard error dollars/driver standard error
North Dakota 38355 363 -54 25 81 31 -46 42 -14 26
South Dakota 46276 413 -60 28 94 36 -50 48 -15 32
Montana 66304 451 -91 46 157 61 -73 79 -16 48
Nebraska 86412 423 -79 44 154 59 -60 76 -9 52
Kansas 95586 446 -77 44 158 61 -56 78 -5 58
Wyoming 104623 419 -110 66 240 93 -78 117 -1 94
Idoha 106675 457 -87 53 193 75 -61 94 0 70
Iowa 116447 410 -101 65 239 92 -68 115 6 66
Nevada 151224 793 -65 53 208 80 -33 98 31 75
Alaska 153453 774 -79 66 259 100 -39 122 24 56
Minnesota 166007 593 -84 79 317 122 -33 147 56 100
Oklahoma 169828 518 -78 76 306 118 -28 142 63 107
New Mexico 173811 655 -77 79 319 123 -24 147 76 121
Arkansas 176172 553 -54 57 230 89 -16 106 70 106
Oregon 178394 569 -62 67 273 105 -16 126 53 78
Mississippi 202024 578 -56 86 363 140 9 165 124 135
Colorado 206060 680 -51 85 359 139 14 163 96 99
Vermont 218398 503 -34 76 328 127 27 147 119 108
Utah 224380 570 -29 80 344 133 36 154 140 120
Wisconsin 230553 483 -22 79 344 133 44 154 145 118
Missouri 243347 566 -10 90 395 152 68 175 195 142
West Virginia 244869 668 -7 86 378 146 67 168 169 121
Alabama 266154 560 19 88 395 152 100 173 249 153
Maine 277816 463 36 94 427 165 126 187 250 142
Kentucky 280899 604 38 91 413 159 127 180 291 163
South Carolina 295083 595 62 98 448 173 160 195 308 159
Texas 295525 682 62 97 444 171 160 193 294 151
Louisiana 299164 786 80 116 530 204 197 230 300 151
Washington 301015 633 77 109 496 191 188 215 265 132
Tennessee 325458 545 134 126 578 223 270 249 392 173
Illinois 336716 589 146 119 546 211 277 235 353 148
Indiana 345358 543 201 149 681 263 367 293 528 214
New Hampshire 353359 603 192 131 601 232 341 258 375 148
Arizona 356960 723 181 120 547 211 317 235 494 192
Michigan 364955 695 217 134 609 235 371 262 454 171
Georgia 380431 631 273 149 674 260 447 289 670 240
North Carolina 386686 520 255 134 601 232 413 258 590 207
Pennsylvania 389975 663 249 128 574 221 401 247 465 162
Ohio 425902 530 406 170 742 286 614 320 639 202
Virginia 475461 530 555 193 791 305 795 347 955 275
New York 498337 920 547 178 708 273 769 313 794 221
Florida 527303 716 609 186 705 272 840 317 906 244
Rhode Island 559748 896 787 227 815 314 1066 374 967 253
Delaware 619775 787 1121 299 972 375 1480 466 1651 417
Connecticut 642792 865 1227 321 1002 386 1608 489 1480 371
Massachusetts 681249 801 1386 352 1030 397 1795 520 1610 399
Maryland 708803 708 1529 382 1068 412 1967 553 2091 516
California 728974 744 1900 470 1271 490 2432 670 2231 549
New Jersey 802828 1091 2059 496 1193 460 2599 676 2273 556
Hawaii 899518 990 2737 646 1349 520 3408 842 2796 686
Notes
1. External Marginal Cost of Additional Driver is calculated from per-mile-cost assuming that a driver drives average number of miles in state.
Quadratic Premiums per Mile Model
(based on specification 12)
Quadratic Premiums per Vehicle Model
(based on specification 8) (based on specification 3)
Quadratic Insuror Costs Model
(based on specification 10)TABLE 5 - EXTERNAL ACCIDENT COST DECOMPOSITION 
State Traffic Density External Accident Cost External Accident Cost
(1996) from Crash Frequency standard error from Crash Severity standard error
(dollars/driver) (dollars/driver)
North Dakota 38354.96 10 26 -16 24
South Dakota 46275.52 13 31 -22 34
Montana 66304 22 47 -32 51
Nebraska 86411.87 19 36 -50 86
Kansas 95585.85 34 62 -36 64
Wyoming 104622.7 44 77 -40 74
Idaho 106674.9 38 66 -35 66
Iowa 116446.8 39 65 -35 69
Nevada 151223.5 64 89 -42 105
Alaska 153453.2 57 78 -27 69
Minnesota 166006.5 106 137 -32 94
Oklohoma 169828.3 66 84 -37 112
New Mexico 173811.2 75 95 -44 138
Arkansas 176172.4 140 174 -19 61
Oregon 178394.3 79 97 -23 78
Mississippi 202024.1 106 119 -21 107
Colorado 206059.6 147 163 -15 84
Vermont 218397.9 217 230 -5 46
Utah 224379.9 53 55 -22 252
Wisconsin 230552.5 100 102 -6 115
Missouri 243346.6 114 112 2 153
West Virginia 244868.9 121 118 3 144
Alabama 266154.4 154 144 16 113
Maine 277816.3 122 111 31 152
Kentucky 280899.2 171 155 36 162
South Carolina 295083.4 181 161 48 158
Texas 295524.8 117 103 59 194
Louisiana 299164.4 279 246 40 124
Washington 301015.1 129 114 58 175
Tennessee 325457.9 166 144 82 179
Illinois 336715.7 190 164 89 172
Indiana 345358.1 245 211 118 211
New Hampshire 353359.3 272 234 75 128
Arizona 356959.5 252 217 148 243
Michigan 364954.8 223 192 145 226
Georgia 380431.3 248 215 210 301
North Carolina 386686.1 197 172 221 307
Pennsylvania 389975.2 288 251 142 194
Ohio 425902 189 170 300 359
Virginia 475460.8 415 392 293 315
New York 498336.7 306 296 513 534
Florida 527303.3 322 323 443 446
Rhode Island 559748.4 514 534 494 486
Delaware 619775.3 837 927 614 586
Connecticut 642791.9 680 770 807 765
Massachusetts 681249.1 841 987 702 659
Maryland 708802.7 1220 1468 654 611
California 728973.8 1003 1227 763 711
New Jersey 802828.4 1035 1339 1507 1395
Hawaii 899518.3 1633 2247 1339 1236TABLE 6 - EXTERNAL ACCIDENT COST OF FATALITIES
State Traffic Density External Accident Cost
(1996) from Fatalities standard error
(dollars/driver)
North Dakota 38354.96 -54.63 57.1
South Dakota 46275.52 -64.36 68.58
Montana 66304 -93.27 104.76
Nebraska 86411.87 -94.81 112.99
Kansas 95585.85 -104.42 128.18
Wyoming 104622.7 -162.37 205.55
Idaho 106674.9 -121.21 154.56
Iowa 116446.8 -109.42 144.63
Nevada 151223.5 -108.57 166.59
Alaska 153453.2 -80.07 124.2
Minnesota 166006.5 -134.23 222.26
Oklohoma 169828.3 -139.99 236.77
New Mexico 173811.2 -154.53 267.42
Arkansas 176172.4 -134.05 235.23
Oregon 178394.3 -97.66 173.67
Mississippi 202024.1 -142.36 297.19
Colorado 206059.6 -101.93 219.56
Vermont 218397.9 -99.76 238.56
Utah 224379.9 -104.58 264.53
Wisconsin 230552.5 -96.2 259.03
Missouri 243346.6 -99.57 310.55
West Virginia 244868.9 -83.49 265.47
Alabama 266154.4 -75.39 333.12
Maine 277816.3 -54.21 307.57
Kentucky 280899.2 -57.21 351.32
South Carolina 295083.4 -33.92 339.34
Texas 295524.8 -31.69 323.47
Louisiana 299164.4 -26.26 321.96
Washington 301015.1 -20.6 281.58
Tennessee 325457.9 14.56 362.3
Illinois 336715.7 28.89 307.79
Indiana 345358.1 59.86 441.28
New Hampshire 353359.3 52.76 301.95
Arizona 356959.5 75.22 390.94
Michigan 364954.8 80.26 346.01
Georgia 380431.3 147.77 477.72
North Carolina 386686.1 139.88 410.37
Pennsylvania 389975.2 114.12 319.21
Ohio 425902 207.52 383.95
Virginia 475460.8 390.42 493.27
New York 498336.7 349.77 386.88
Florida 527303.3 431.19 413.99
Rhode Island 559748.4 493.08 415.5
Delaware 619775.3 927.04 650.44
Connecticut 642791.9 855.92 568.59
Massachusetts 681249.1 971.19 597.7
Maryland 708802.7 1294.95 761.8
California 728973.8 1405.47 803.4
New Jersey 802828.4 1509.83 796.12
Hawaii 899518.3 1955.31 965.99
Notes:
1. Estimates are computed assuming fatality cost of $6,000,000
2. Estimates are computed using IV estimates